United States law enforcement agencies are continuing to pursue their goal of cracking down on China’s efforts to capitalize on research funded by the United States. On December 30, 2019, a Chinese medical student, Zaosong Zheng, was held without bail after his arrest at Boston’s Logan Airport for allegedly trying to smuggle biological specimens stolen from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center obtained in the course of his work there as a cancer researcher.  According to the government, after initially stating that he was not carrying any biological items or research materials, Zheng ultimately admitted that he planned to take the specimens in his luggage to the lab where he worked in China, conduct further research, and publish a paper in his name. Zheng was charged with making false statements to Customs officials in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He was deemed a flight risk and held without bail because his connections to the Chinese government, which gave him a scholarship, would make it easier to leave the country.

Zheng’s airport arrest is the most recent in a series of Boston-based researchers being stopped at Logan Airport as part of the government’s enforcement effort. Sources cited by The Boston Globe indicated that there have been approximately 18 individuals stopped at Logan Airport, resulting in confiscation of biological materials and visa cancellation.

These recent trends have been driven by an acute focus on researchers under the influence of the Chinese government attempting to capitalize on U.S. scientific research. In November 2019, a subcommittee of the Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs released a report about the “Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plants” detailing China’s concerted efforts to infiltrate and capitalize on U.S. scientific research. The report provided examples of scientists attempting to take sensitive documents and other materials to China, submitting false information when applying for U.S. grant funds, filing a patent based on U.S. government-funded research, failing to disclose the receipt of money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant applications, and foreign influence in the peer review process, among other issues.

Researchers need to be aware of the disclosure requirements for grant applications and keep them in mind when accepting support from other sources. In 2019, multiple government agencies updated and/or clarified their requirements for disclosing support—both financial and non-financial—from outside entities and, in particular, foreign sources. The National Institute of Health, for example, issued a series of documents in July 2019 “clarifying” its policies on disclosing “other support” received by researchers and senior/key personnel, including:

All positions and scientific appointments, both domestic and foreign, held by senior/key personnel that are relevant the grant, including affiliations with foreign entities or governments (regardless of whether paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time)

All resources and other support for senior/key personnel, including current support for ongoing projects regardless of what entity is providing the support; and

All current projects and activities that involve senior/key personnel, even if the support is only in-kind (e.g, office/lab space, equipment, supplies, employees, scientific materials, selection to a foreign “talents” or similar-type program or domestic support)

Researchers and institutions alike will be monitoring the developing requirements for disclosures and other best practices in 2020, while balancing the need to support foreign research collaboration and the vast majority of foreign researchers committed to contributing to the research community.